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Confronting Nuclear Terrorism
By Louis REN BERBs*
"Defenceless under the night
Our world in stupor lies ... 1
In an age that joins political violence with the unlocked secrets of
the atom, there can be no more frightful example of W.H. Auden's vision
than nuclear terrorism. For the United States, naturally, the issue as-
sumes particular urgency.
What would happen if future instances of anti-U.S. terrorism were
to involve the threat or use of nuclear weapons (eg., nuclear explosives
or radioactivity)? Are we prepared to deal with such fearful contingen-
cies? Or does the record of recent American impotence in the face of
conventional terrorism suggest even greater levels of vulnerability?
The questions are compelling. In the hazardous flux of world af-
fairs, the spectre of nuclear terrorism is ominous. Understandably, fresh
visions of desolation now kindle our imaginations, reinforcing already
troubled feelings of powerlessness and frustration.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is fraught with disquieting possibili-
ties. Yet, it is too soon to despair. There are steps that can be taken to
reduce the danger. With these moves, the United States could begin to
take the first critical steps back from the brink and show an "affirming
flame." 2
I. IDENTIFYING THE TERRORISTS
Before the United States can cope with the risk of nuclear terrorism,
our leaders must understand the difference between lawful and unlawful
insurgencies. This understanding must be based upon more than the se-
lective intuitions of geopolitics. Specifically, it must rest upon well-estab-
lished jurisprudential standards which reflect international law.
* Ph.D., Princeton, 1971. The author is a professor of political science and interm-
tional law at Purdue University, and lectures and publishes widely on matters relating to nu-
clear war, nuclear strategy, and human rights.
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What, exactly, are these standards? International law has consist-
ently proscribed particular acts of international terrorism.3 At the same
time, however, it permits certain uses of force that derive from
[t]he inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien
domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular,
the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of
the organs of the United Nations.4
This exemption is corroborated by article 7 of the UN General As-
sembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular Article 3 [inventory of
acts that qualify as aggression] could in any way p:rejudice the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with
3. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 43 (1974) (entered into force for the United States on
Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United States on Dec. 13, 1972),
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force for the United States
on Dec. 4, 1969); Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 14,
1971); Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force for the United States on
Jan. 26, 1973); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 24, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (entered into force on Aug. 4,
1978).
On December 9, 1985, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution con-
demning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." United Nations Resolution on TerrorLsm, G.A.
Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/50/53 (1985). Never before
had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question, Yet, the
issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except
for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons
that were already criminalized by previous custom and conventions. Id. at 302.
4. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
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the above-mentioned Declaration.5
International law has also approved certain forms of insurgency that
are directed toward improved human rights where repression is neither
colonial nor racist. Together with a number of important covenants,
treaties, and declarations, the UN Charter codifies many binding norms
regarding the protection of human rights. Comprising a well-defined r-
gime,6 these rules of international law are effectively enforceable only by
the actions of individual states or by lawful insurgencies or by both.7
5. Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 144, U.N.
Doe. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 LL.M. 710, 714 (1974). Article 7 refers to the October
24, 1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For a comprehensive and authoritative
inventory of sources of international law concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-
determination, see A. CRIsrEscU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BAsIs OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/404/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981).
6. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71
(1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.LM. 352 (1966); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200,21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 360 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
7. The reader may recall that the sources of international law, according to article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, are found also in international custom, the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the writings of
highly qualified publicists. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187. Additional support for the lawfulness of
certain forms of insurgency can be identified in nontreaty sources. For example, the U.S.
Declaration of Independence, as an expression of natural law, is an authoritative instance of
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and therefore sets limits on the
authority of every government- Since justice, according to the Founding Fathers, must bind
all human society, the rights articulated by the Declaration cannot be reserved only to U.S.
citizens. To deny these rights to others would be illogical and self-contradictory, since it
would undermine the permanent and universal law of nature from which the Declaration is
derived. This understanding was represented by Thomas Paine, who affirmed:
The Independence of America, considered merely as a separation from England,
would have been a matter but of little importance, had it not been accompanied by a
Revolution in the principles and practices of Governments. She made a stand, not
for herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herself could
receive.
T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 151 (Everyman ed. 1951). Indeed, in view of the longstand-
ing support for various forms of insurgency in multiple sources of positive and natural law, it is
reasonable to argue that a peremptory norm of general international law (ajus cogens norm)
has emerged on this matter. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Support for such insurgency is not the creation of modem interna-
tional law. Where insurgency is viewed as resistance to despotism, it is
rooted as a permissible practice in the Bible and in the writings of ancient
and medieval classics. It can be found, for example, in Aristotle's Poli-
tics, Plutarch's Lives, and Cicero's De Officiis.8
This brings us to the first jurisprudential standard for differentiating
between lawful insurgency and terrorism, one commonly known as "just
cause." 9 Where individual states prevent the exercise of human rights,
insurgency may express law-enforcing reactions under international law.
For this to be the case, the means used in that insurgency must be consis-
tent with the second jurisprudential standard, conmmonly known as "just
means."
10
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art,
53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 699 (1969). Even a treaty that
might seek to criminalize forms of insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be
invalid. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of
its conclusion, it conflictswith a peremptory norm of general international law." Id. art, 53,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698 (1969). The concept is extended to newly emerging peremptory
norms by article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory norm of general international
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and termi.
nates." Id. art. 64, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 703 (1969).
8. THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTOICAL ANTHOLory 10-13, 16, 17-19 (W. Lac-
quer ed. 1978).
9. The principle of "just cause" derives from multiple sources of pertinent international
law, including international custom; the general principles of law recognized by nations; UN
General Assembly resolutions; various judicial decisions; specific compacts and documents
(ag., The Magna Carta (England, 1215); the Petition of Right (England, 1628); The Bill of
Rights (England, 1689); The Declaration of Independence (U.S., 1776); The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France, 1789)); and the writings of highly-qualified publi-
cists (eg., Cicero, Francisco de Victoris, Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel). The principle of
"just cause" also derives, by extrapolation, from the convergence of human rights law with the
absence of effective, authoritative central institutions in world politics.
10. On the principle of "just means," see Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 [Hague Regulations], 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
The "more complete code" referred to in the Hague Regulations became available with
the adoption of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. These agreements contain a common
article 3 under which the convention provisions become applicable in noninternational armed
conflicts. Still, the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea that all of the laws of
[Vol. 14
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In deciding whether a particular insurgency is an instance of terror-
ism or law enforcement, states must base their evaluations, in part, on
judgments concerning discrimination, proportionality, and military ne-
cessity. Once force is applied broadly to any segment of a human popu-
lation, blurring the distinction between combatants and noncombatants,
terrorism occurs." Similarly, once force is applied to the fullest possible
extent, restrained only by the limits of available weaponry, terrorism is
underway.1 2
The legitimacy of a certain cause does not legitimize the use of cer-
tain forms of violence. The ends do not justify the means. As in the case
of war between states, every use of force by insurgents must be judged
twice: once with regard to the justness of the objective, and once with
regard to the justness of the means used in pursuit of that objective.1 3
war should apply to internal conflicts, and in 1970 the UN Secretary General requested that
additional rules relating to noninternational armed conflicts be adopted in the form of a proto-
col or a separate convention. These rules were codified on June 8, 1977, when the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Conflicts adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.LM.
1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I] and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interational Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes 1, H (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol I1].
11. See Protocol I, supra note 10, arts. 51-52, reprinted in 16 I.LLM. 1391, 1413-14 (1977).
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 10, passim.
12. See Protocol I, supra note 10, § 1, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1408-10 (1977).
13. The means criterion has important implications for extradition. For an inventory of
extradition agreements in force between the United States and other countries, see CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFAIR,
100TH CONGRESS, IST SESS., REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF
MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS 239-326 (Comm.
Print 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRRORISM]. One problem in such agreements has
been the "political offense exception" to extradition, a provision that extradition need not or
shall not be granted when the acts with which the accused is charged constitute a political
offense or an act connected with a political offense. The Reagan administration addressed the
problem of the "political offense exception" in the context of the Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, June 25, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-8, 99th Con&,
1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra, at 304. Recognizing that
there exist egregious examples of overbroad applications of the exception and that claims of
immunity from extradition based on "relative" political offenses have always been problematic,
the supplementary treaty explicitly identifies particular crimes that may no longer be regarded
as political offenses excepted from the extradition process. These crimes are those typically
committed by terrorists: aircraft hijacking and sabotage; crimes against internationally pro-
tected persons; hostage taking, murder;, manslaughter, malicious assault; kidnapping; and spec-
ified offenses involving firearms, explosives, and serious property damage. Id. art. 1, reprinted
1990]
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Significantly, from the viewpoint of international law, any use of nu-
clear weapons by an insurgent group would represent a serious violation
of the laws of war.14 Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions makes the
law concerning international conflicts applicable to conflicts fought for
self-determination against alien occupation and colonialist and racist re-
gimes. 5 A product of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts (that ended on June 10, 1977), the protocol (which was
justified by the decolonization provisions of the UN Charter and by reso-
lutions of the General Assembly) brings irregular forces within the full
scope of the law of armed conflict. Protocol 2 of the Geneva Conven-
tions concerns protection of victims of noninternational armed con-
flicts.16 Hence, this protocol applies to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by Protocol I occurring within the territory of a state between its
legitimate armed forces and dissident armed forces.1 7
In support of the principle that foreign intervention is unlawful un-
less it is understood as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of
human rights, most major texts and treatises on international law"8 have
long expressed the opinion that a state is forbidden to engage in military
or paramilitary operations against another state with which it is not at
war.19 Today, the long-standing customary prohibition against foreign
in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra, at 305-06. Although the treaty concerns the political
offense exception only between the two countries involved, it represents part of a potentially
incremental process, one that could be expanded to include many other states. Moreover,
limits on the political offense exception are already contained in other, complementary sources
of international law. For more information on U.S. efforts in this area, see A. SOVAER, TIM
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION AND TERRORISM (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State Current Policy No. 762, 1985).
14. These laws have been brought to bear upon non-state actors in world politics by arti-
cle 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and by the two protocols
to the conventions.
15. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 1, para. 4, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1397 (1977).
16. Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 1, para. 1, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1443 (1977).
17. Id.
18. See STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERIIATIONAL JUSTICE, Dec. 13,
1920, art. 38, para. 4, 6 L.N.T.S. 379, 405.
19. See, e.g., E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 130-31 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916); 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: TalE
LAW OF PEACE 274 (1977). These examples are supported by a broad variety of UN declara-
tions, especially the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) and the Declaration on Principles oflnterna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970). Moreover, as certain "judicial decisions" tre identified as authoritative
sources of international law at article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
supra note 7, 59 Stat. at 1059, 3 Bevans at 1187, the decision of the ICJ in the matter of U.S.
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support for lawless insurgencies is codified in the UN Charter and in the
authoritative interpretation of that multilateral treaty at article 1 and ar-
ticle 3(g) of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression. °
All states must normally defend their legal systems, embodied in
their own constitutions, against aggression.21 According to Mr. Hersch
Lauterpacht, the following rule concerns the scope of state responsibility
for preventing acts of insurgency or terrorism against other states:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining per-
sons within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities
against friendly States as amount to organized acts of force in the form
of hostile expeditions against the territory of those States. It also
obliges the States to repress and discourage activities in which attempts
against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper means of
revolutionary action.'
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and Du-
ties of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized Gov-
ernments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute of
International Law in 1900.3 His rule, however, stops short of the pre-
scription offered by Mr. Emmerich de Vattel. According to de Vattel,
states that support terrorism directed at other states become the lawful
prey of the world community:
If, then there should be found a restless and unprincipled Nation, ever
ready to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up
intervention in Nicaragua represents another pertinent example of appropriate prohibitions.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ.
14 (commonly known as the Military Activities Case or the Nicaraguan Mining Case).
20. Definition of Aggression, supra note 5, arts. 1, 3(g), at 143, reprinted in 13 LTM. 710,
713-14 (1974). In the United States, these codifications are supported by various elements of
federal law. Under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L No. 87-195, 75
Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), the United
States shall not provide any assistance to any country "which the President determines (1)
grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group which has committed an act of
international terrorism, or (2) otherwise supports international terrorism." 22 U.S.C. § 237 1(a)
(1988). Significantly, according to section 2371(b), "[t]he President may waive the application
of subsection (a) ... to a country if the President determines that national security or humani-
tarian reasons justify such waiver." 22 U.S.C. § 2371(b) (1988). In other words, U.S. support
for international law concerning state assistance to terrorists can be reversed where the Presi-
dent determines that "national security or humanitarian reasons" dictate overriding support
for either the terrorists or their state patrons or both. See also Export-Import Bank Act of
1945; ch. 341, 59 Stat. 526 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1988)); Arms Export Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 85 Stat. 2053 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.).
21. See 3 H. LATrrERPAcHT, supra note 19.
22. Id. at 274.
23. De Lapradelle, Introduction to E. DE VArrTE, supra note 19.
1990]
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civil strife among their citizens, there is no doubt that all others would
have the right to unite together to subdue such a Nation, to discipline
it, and even to disable it from doing further harm,2 4
States also have an obligation to treat captured insurgents in con-
formity with the basic dictates of international law.25 Although this obli-
gation does not normally interfere with a state's right to regard those
persons not engaged in armed conflict (i.e., persons involved merely in
internal disturbances, riots, isolated and specific acts of violence, or other
acts of a similar nature) as common or ordinary criminals, 26 it does mean
that all other captives "remain under the protection and authority of the
principles... of humanity and [of] the dictates of public conscience."' 27
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict, an
additional obligation must be imposed on states to extend the privileged
status of prisoner of war (POW) to such persons.2 This additional obli-
gation is unaffected by an insurgent's respect for the international laws of
war. "While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict," violations of these rules do
not automatically deprive an insurgent combatant of his or her right to
protection equivalent in all respects to that accorded POWs. 29
How has U.S. foreign policy responded to jurisprudential expecta-
tions concerning insurgency? The Reagan administration embraced only
one standard of judgment: anti-Sovietism. Human rights had nothing to
do with this standard. It follows that efforts to overthrow allegedly pro-
Soviet regimes were always conducted by "freedom. fighters" (even where
these efforts involved rape, pillage, and mass murder), while efforts to
oppose anti-Soviet regimes (even where these efforts were undertaken by
the most oppressed and downtrodden victims of genocidal regimes) were
always conducted by "terrorists."
Yet, U.S. foreign policy is not the only facilitator of potential nu-
clear terrorism against this country. Even if there were a dramatic trans-
formation of current policy orientations under the Bush administration, a
significant hazard would remain. To reduce this hazard, major improve-
24. E. DE VATrEL, supra note 19, at 130.
25. Protocol I, supra note 10, pt. 3, § 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1410-12 (1977);
Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 5, at 37-38, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444-45 (1977). See
also Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, passim.
26. Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 1, para. 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1443 (1977).
27. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 1, para. 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 1391, 1396-97
(1977).
28. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 45, reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391, 1411 (1977). See also
Third Geneva Convention, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
29. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 44, para. 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1410 (1977).
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ments are needed to prevent terrorist access to assembled nuclear weap-
ons, nuclear power plants, and nuclear waste storage facilities. Included
in these improvements are measures to contain the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional countries.
H1. IDENTIFYING THE THREAT
To undertake acts of nuclear terrorism, insurgent or revolutionary
groups would require access to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants,
or nuclear waste storage facilities. Should they seek to acquire an assem-
bled weapon, terrorists could aim at any of the tens of thousands of nu-
clear weapons now deployed in the national or alliance arsenals of the
United States, the Soviet Union, France, England, India, Israel, and
China. Moreover, because the number of states possessing nuclear weap-
ons is certain to grow, such terrorists are destined to have an enlarged
arena of opportunity.
Should they seek to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, ter-
rorists would require both special strategic nuclear materials and the ex-
pertise to convert them into bombs or radiological weapons. Both
requirements are now well within the range of terrorist capabilities.
Some 260 commercial nuclear power plants are operating in the West
today, each with the capacity to produce bomb-capable plutonium."
Approximately twenty plants in seventeen countries can now process
plutonium from spent reactor fuel.31
Significantly, the amounts of nuclear materials present in other
countries will probably increase. Pilot reprocessing plants used to ex-
tract weapon-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods signal dan-
gerous conditions. Unless immediate and effective steps are taken to
inhibit the spread of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment
facilities to other countries, terrorist opportunities to acquire fissionable
materials for nuclear weapon purposes could reach very high levels.
To manufacture its own nuclear weapons, a terrorist group would
also require expertise. It is now well known that such expertise is widely
available.3 2 There are two basic methods of assembling fissile material in
a nuclear explosive: the assembly of two or more subcritical masses us-
ing gun propellants and the achievement of supercriticality of fissile ma-
30. See T. Davies, What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?, in
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE THREAT 56 (1986).
31. Id
32. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 140
(1977).
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terial via high explosives. 33 "[M]ilitarily useful weapons with reliable
nuclear yields in the kiloton range can be constructed with reactor-grade
plutonium, using low technology."' 34 Indeed, with the weapons material
and a fraction of a million dollars, "a small group of people, none of
whom had ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly de-
sign and build a crude nuclear explosive device."- 5
Another path to nuclear capability by terrorists could involve the
sabotage of nuclear reactor facilities. It is now apparent that such acts
could pose monumental problems for responsible government authori-
ties. These problems are especially apparent in the aftermath of the So-
viet nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the spring of 1986.
What can be done to protect against sabotage of nuclear reactors by
terrorists? According to the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington,
D.C., the following steps should be taken:
1. Denial of access to nuclear facilities should be the basic considera-
tion in protecting against sabotage ....
2. Thorough vigilance against the insider threat is needed ....
3. Guard forces should be thoroughly trained and authorized to use
deadly force ....
4. The basis used for designing physical protection of nuclear plants
should be reviewed to ensure that it accurately reflects the current
threat ....
5. Power reactors should be protected against vehicular threats ....
6. Research reactors should have adequate security provisions
against terrorists ....
7. Reactor safety designs should be reexamined to protect against an
accident caused by terrorists ....
8. IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] physical protection
guidelines should be reviewed and updated ....
9. Protection standards should be spelled out unambiguously. 36
In the end, however, efforts at "hardening the target" 37 will not be
enough. Although physical security measures are indispensable and need
to be implemented internationally, 38an all-consuming preoccupation
33. Id. at 250-51.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 140.
36. PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TASK
FORCE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 21-23 (P. Leventhal & Y. Alexander eds.
1987) [hereinafter PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM].
37. This expression, adapted from the lexicon of military tactics by the author, refers to
physical measures of counter-nuclear terrorism.
38. With reference to the protection of assembled nuclear weapons, principal responsibil-
ity in the United States rests with the Department of Defense (DOD). From the standpoint of
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with guards, firearms, fences, and space-age protection devices would be
counterproductive. A behavioral strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism,
one that is directed toward producing certain changes in the decisional
calculi of terrorist groups and their sponsor states, is a prerequisite.
I. IDENTIFYING THE ADVERSARY:
BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES
A behavioral strategy must be based upon a sound understanding of
the risk calculations of terrorists. Until the special terrorist stance on the
balance of risks that can be taken in world politics is understood, we will
not be able to identify an appropriate system of sanctions. Although ter-
rorists are typically apt to tolerate higher levels of death and injury than
states, there is a threshold beyond which certain costs become
intolerable.
To understand this threshold, we must first note that there is no
such thing as "the terrorist mind." Rather, there are a great many ter-
rorist minds, a broad potpourri of ideas, methods, visions, and objectives.
To seek a uniformly applicable strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism
would thus be foolhardy.
Yet, in spite of the obvious heterogeneity that characterizes modem
terrorism, it would be immensely impractical to formulate myriad 3trate-
gies which are tailored to particular groups. A limited and manageable
number of basic strategies that are formed according to the principal
effective worldwide standards for nuclear weapons, it appears that the most promising course
would involve widespread imitation and replication of the best of those measures and proce-
dures developed by the DOD. See An Act to Combat International Terrorism Hearings on &
2236Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1978) (state-
ment of Thomas J. O'Brien, Director, Security Plans Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense)[hereinafter Hearings]. "These measures and procedures, which are con-
tinually being upgraded and scrutinized, include: a Permissive Action Link (PAL) program,
which consists of 'a code system and a family of devices integral or attached to nuclear weap-
ons that have been developed to reduce the probability of an unauthorized nuclear detonation,'
L.R. BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLmCS-(1980); a Person-
nel Reliability Program (PRP), which consists of a continual screening and evaluation of nu-
clear duty personnel to assure reliability; a series of storage area classifications that delineate
viable zones of protection; an Intrusion Detection Alarm (IDA) system; security forces capa-
ble of withstanding and repelling seizure efforts by terrorists; two-person concept control dur-
ing any operation that may afford access to nuclear weapons, whereby 'a minimum of two (2)
authorized personnel, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with
respect to the task to be performed and familiar with applicable safety and security require-
ments, shall be present'; counterintelligence and investigative services to actively seek informa-
tion concerning threats to nuclear weapons; and carefully worked out logistic movement
procedures, to ensure nuclear weapons security in transit" See LR. BEM.s, TERRORISM AND
GLOBAL SEcuRrY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT 67 (1979).
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types of terrorist group behavior must be established. By adopting this
means of "blueprinting" effective counter-nuclear terrorist action, policy-
makers can choose a decision-making strategy in which options are dif-
ferentiated according to the particular category of risk-calculation
involved.
This is not to suggest that each terrorist group is comprised of indi-
viduals who exhibit the same pattern of behavior, i.e., the same stance on
the balance of risks that can be taken in pursuit of particular preferences.
Rather, each terrorist group is made up, in varying degrees, of persons
with disparate motives. Since it is essential, from the viewpoint of creat-
ing the necessary decisional strategy, that each terrorist group be catego-
rized according to a particular type of risk-calculation, the task is to
identify and evaluate the leadership strata of each terrorist group in or-
der to determine the predominant ordering of preferences.
In terms of actually mounting an effective counter-nuclear terrorist
strategy, governments must organize their activities according to the fol-
lowing sequence of responsibilities:
1. Appraise the terrorist group under scrutiny to identify who the
leaders are.
2. Appraise the leadership elements to identify predominant patterns
of risk-calculation.
3. Examine the decision-making strategy in order to identify the ap-
propriate type of counter-nuclear terrorist strategy, i.e., the strat-
egy that corresponds with the identified pattern of risk-calculation.
In so organizing their counter-nuclear terrorist activities, governments
can begin to develop a rationally conceived "behavioral technology"
which distinguishes contingencies of reinforcement according to the par-
ticular type of terrorists involved. To deal effectively with the prospec-
tive problem of nuclear terrorism, it is essential to correlate deterrent and
remedial measures with the preference orderings and modus operandi of
the particular terrorist group(s) in question.
For example, if a terrorist group displaying the self-sacrificing value
system of certain Shiite factions in the Middle East were to threaten nu-
clear violence, it would be inappropriate to base deterrence on threats, of
physically punishing acts of retaliation. Here, negative physical sanc-
tions, unless they are devastating enough to ensure destruction of the
group itself, are bound to be ineffective. Indeed, such sanctions might
even have the effect of a stimulus.39 Instead of orthodox threats of pun-
39. A case in point concerns Israeli responses to Hizballah t-.rrorism in South Lebanon,
which have sometimes nurtured a cycle of violence rather than curtailed insurgent assaults
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ishment, deterrence in this case should be based upon threats which
promise to obstruct those goals which the terrorist group values even
more highly than physical safety.
Such threats, therefore, should be directed at convincing terrorists
that resorting to nuclear violence would militate against their political
objectives. To support such threats, steps would probably have to be
taken to convince the terrorists that higher order acts of violence are apt
to generate broad-based repulsion rather than support. As long as the
threatened act of nuclear violence stems from propagandistic motives,
terrorists who associate such violence with unfavorable publicity may be
inclined to employ less violent strategies.
Deterrence in this case might also be based upon the promise of
rewards. Such a strategy of "positive sanctions" has been left out of cur-
rent studies of counter-terrorism; yet, this strategy may prove to be one
of the few potentially worthwhile ways of affecting the decisional calculi
of terrorist groups with self-sacrificing value systems. In considering
whether this sort of strategy is appropriate in particular situations, gov-
ernments will have to decide whether the expected benefits that accrue
from avoiding nuclear terrorism are sufficient to outweigh the prospec-
tive costs associated with the promised concessions.
The reasonableness of such a strategy is also enhanced by its prob-
able long-term systemic effects. Just as violence tends to beget more vio-
lence, rewards tend to generate more rewards. By the incremental
replacement of negative sanctions with positive ones, a growing number
of actors in world politics, terrorists as well as states, are apt to become
habituated to the ideology of a reward system, and are likely to disengage
from the dynamics of a threat or punishment system. The cumulative
effect of such habituation is likely to be a more peaceful and harmonious
world and national system.
For a second example, we may consider the case of a terrorist group
which exhibits a preference ordering very much like that of an ordinary
criminal band, Le, its actions are dictated largely by incentives of mate-
rial gain, however much these incentives are rationalized in terms of
political objectives. If such a terrorist group threatens nuclear violence,
it would be as inappropriate to base deterrence on threats of political
failure or negative public reception as it would be to threaten self-sacrific-
ing ideologues with personal harm. Rather, deterrence in this case
against Israel, and have encouraged suicide bombings and attacks. Sederberg, Responses to
Dissident Terrorism: From Myth to Maturity, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHARACTERIS-
TICS, CAUSES, CoNTRoLs 263 (C. Kegley ed. 1990).
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should be based largely upon the kinds of threats that are used to counter
orthodox criminality.
This is not to suggest, however, that threats of physical punishment
will always be productive in dealing with this type of terrorist group.
Even though this particular type, unlike the self-sacrificing variety con-
sidered in the first example, is apt to value personal safety in its ordering
of preferences, threats to impair this safety may be misconceived. In-
deed, a great deal of sophisticated conceptual analysis and experimental
evidence now seems to indicate that, in certain cases, the threat of physi-
cal punishment may actually prove counter-productive. 4
Contrary to the widely held conventional wisdom on the matter,
taking a "hard-line" against terrorists may only reinforce antagonism
and intransigence. Recent experience indicates that physical retaliation
against terrorists often causes only a shift in the selection of targets and a
more protracted pattern of violence and aggression.41 The threat of
physical punishment against terrorists is apt to generate high levels of
anger that effectively raise the threshold of acceptable suffering. This is
the case because anger can modify usual cost-benefit calculations, over-
riding the inhibitions ordinarily associated with anticipated punishment.
The discussion of negative sanctions has thus far been limited to
physical punishment. However, there is considerable evidence that all
kinds of negative sanctions, economic as well as physical, increase rather
than diminish terrorist resistance.4 2 Whatever the nature of negative
sanctions, they appear to generate anger which causes terrorists to value
retaliation (or counter-retaliation, whichever the case may be) more
highly than the objectives that have given rise to the terrorist activity in
the first place.
For a third example, we may consider the case of a terrorist group
which exhibits a primary concern for achieving one form or another of
political objective, but which lacks a self-sacrificing value system. If this
sort of terrorist group threatens nuclear violence, it would be appropriate
to base deterrence on a suitable combination of all of the negative and
positive sanctions discussed thus far. This means that steps should be
taken to convince the group that: 1) nuclear violence would militate
against its political objectives; 2) certain concessions would be granted in
exchange for restraint from nuclear violence; and 3) certain physically
40. Id. at 270.
41. See supra note 39.
42. For an interesting original discussion of positive or "conciliatory" responses to terror-
ism, see P. SEDERBERG, TERRORIST MYTHS: ILLUSION, RHETORIC AND REALITY (1989).
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punishing or otherwise negative acts of retaliation would be meted out if
a group undertakes nuclear violence.
In determining what constitutes suitable sanctions, governments will
have to be especially discriminating in threatening physical punishment.
It is worth noting that threats of mild punishment may have a greater
deterrent effect than threats of severe punishment. From the vantage
point of the terrorist group's particular baseline of expectations, mild
threats-when threats of severe punishment are expected-may even ap-
pear to have positive qualities. Catching the terrorist group by surprise,
such threats are also less likely to elicit the high levels of anger and in-
tractability that tend to override the inhibiting factor of expected punish-
ment. Moreover, the threat of mild punishment is less likely to support
the contention of official repression, a contention that is often a vital part
of terrorist group strategies for success.
In reference to the actual promise of rewards as an instrument of
deterrence, governments may find it worthwhile to consider whether a
selected number of particular concessions would produce a gainful net
effect. In other words, recognizing that threats of severe punishment
produce rationality-impairing stress, which in turn produces greater
resistance rather than compliance, governments may discover that the
promise of rewards communicates feelings of sympathy and concern,
which in turn diminish terrorist resistance. With such an understanding,
governments may begin to delimit the particular concessions which they
are prepared to make.
A fourth and final example that illustrates the need to correlate de-
terrent and situational measures with particular preference orderings
centers on the case of terrorist groups spurred on by the need for spectac-
ular self-assertion. From the standpoint of preventing nuclear violence,
this type of terrorist group presents the greatest problems. Faced with
terrorist groups who long to act out desperate urgings, governments may
be confronted with genuine psychopaths and sociopaths. Clearly, since
the preference that would need to be obstructed in this case is neither
political success nor personal profit, but the violent act itself, and since
personal safety is unlikely to figure importantly in the terrorist risk-
calculus, deterrence of nuclear terrorism must be abandoned altogether
as a viable strategy. Instead, all preventive measures must concentrate
upon limiting the influence of such terrorists within their particular
groups, and maintaining a safe distance between such terrorists and the
instruments of higher order weapons technologies.
What are the roots of this need for spectacular self-assertion? To
some extent they may lie in a more general satisfaction of our species that
1990
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flows from exercising the powers of destruction, in what Mr. Kenneth
Boulding calls "destruction as relief from powerlessness. '43 Recognizing
that all human beings have, at some time, sought the pleasure of personal
destructive power, Boulding reminds us that "[tihere is something dra-
matic and sudden about the exercise of destructive power." 44 The satis-
factions that result from such an exercise have been known by a great
variety of groups, including the very states in world politics that are
quick to denounce terrorism.
But there is also something very specific about the need for spectac-
ular self-assertion which now occupies our interest-something that goes
beyond the more general (albeit, unacknowledged) social inclination to-
ward destructive power. At one level, this need may reflect little more
than a totally rational method of achieving one's political goals. In this
case, of course, the "need" is merely contrived, but the outcome is alto-
gether indifferent to authenticity.
Again, the comparison with state behavior is instructive. In a world
in which states now routinely prepare for omnicidal nuclear warfare,
there is little analytic point in condemning subnational groups for seek-
ing their particular objectives via threats or acts of more-or-less spectacu-
lar violence. For members of a generation that have been nurtured in a
world characterized by the most massive intrusion of criminal violence
into politics, individual terrorists who turn to violent means of spectacu-
lar self-assertion may appear strangely "normal."
Although it has remained for the twentieth century to descend fully
into the "age of atrocity,"45 the thoroughly criminal violence of govern-
ments was already recognized in the fifth century by St. Augustine.
Writing in the City of God, an account of the contest between the intrinsi-
cally debased City of Man and the eternally peaceful City of God, St.
Augustine identifies the state as the product of humankind's most despi-
cable tendencies.46 Devoid of justice and destructive of salvation, this
mirror image of human wickedness, we are told, is little more than a
"large gang of robbers."47 Indeed, in an oft-quoted passage, St. Augus-
tine recalls the answer offered by a pirate captured by Alexander the
Great. When Alexander asked the pirate what right he had to infest the
seas, the pirate replied: "The same right that you have to infest the
43. K. BOULDING, THREE FACES OF POWER 82 (1989).
44. Id.
45. This is a term coined by the author to describe our own century.
46. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CrrY OF GOD, Bk. IV, ch. 3, in 18 GREAT BOOKS OF THV
WESTERN WORLD 190 (R.M. Hutchins ed. 1952).
47. Id. Bk. IV, ch. 4, at 190.
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world. But because I do it in a small boat I am called a robber, while
because you do it with a large fleet you are called an emperor."4
The need for spectacular self-assertion can also be the product of an
essentially psychological, as distinguished from political, source. With
nuclear terrorism, we are dealing with the infantile declarations of a
Jerry Rubin, ("When in doubt, burn!"),4 9 or with the genuinely psycho-
pathic feelings of a Kozo Okamoto, the surviving terrorist of the Lydda
Airport massacre, who claimed "a strange ecstasy" in bringing death to
innocents5 0 In both cases, the dominant rationale seems to be to shock,
to outrage, and to reveal potency without any real underlying ideology.
However, the second or "psychopathic" case is also animated by a vari-
ety of complex "internal" satisfactions.
What can we do about these differentially-based inclinations toward
spectacular self-assertion, inclinations that might yield individual acts of
nuclear terrorism? Sadly, very little, to be sure. Confronted with little
less than the persistent drives of human nature, it would appear far more
pragmatic to try to control the behavior of terrorist groups than to re-
move the causes of even their most dangerous predilections. Should we
inquire systematically into the factors likely to transform "engages" 1
into "enrages," 2 we would come face to face with conditions and events
that effectively lie far beyond our control.
IV. BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Developing counter-terrorist strategies within states requires differ-
entiating sanctions according to the particular type of terrorist group in-
volved. However, since nuclear terrorism might take place across
national boundaries, the basic principles of these strategies must also be
applied internationally.
Of course, there are special difficulties involved in implementing be-
havioral measures of counter-nuclear terrorism internationally. These
difficulties center on the fact that certain states sponsor and host terrorist
groups, and that such states extend the privileges of sovereignty to insur-
gents on their land.53 While it is true that international law forbids a
state to use its territory as a base for aggressive operations against a
48. Id.
49. L.R. BEREs, supra note 38, at 6.
50. Id.
51. Those who are "engaged" or partisan.
52. Those who are "enraged" or radicalized.
53. Such states include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya.
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peaceful state,54 a state which seeks to deal with terrorists hosted in an-
other nation is still in a very difficult position.
To cope with these difficulties, like-minded governments must create
special patterns of international cooperation. These patterns must be
based upon the idea that even sovereignty must yield to gross inversions
of the norms expressed in extant documents such as the UN Charter; the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;" the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;56 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights;57 the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 58 the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;59 the
American Convention on Human Rights;6' the Nuremberg principles; 61
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.62 Cooperative patterns must, there-
fore, take the form of collective defense arrangements between particular
states which promise protection and support for responsible and law-en-
forcing acts to counter nuclear terrorism.
Such arrangements must entail plans for cooperative intelligence
gathering on the subject of terrorism, and for exchange of the informa-
tion produced; an expanded and refined tapestry of agreements on extra-
dition of terrorists; multilateral forces to infiltrate terrorist organizations
and, if necessary, to take action against them; concerted use of the media
to publicize terrorist activities and intentions; and even counter-terrorism
emergency medical networks.
International arrangements for counter-nuclear terrorist coopera-
tion must also include sanctions for states which sponsor or support ter-
rorist groups and activities. Sanctions applied to terrorists may include
carrots as well as sticks. Until every state in the world system calculates
54. See Definition ofAggression, supra note 5, art. 3(f), at 14.3, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710,
714 (1974).
55. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
56. Opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 LL.M. 360 (1967).
57. Openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), supra note 6, at 52, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
58. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
59. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
60. Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, reprinted in 9 LL.M. 673 (1970).
61. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l, at 118 (1947).
62. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 10; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note
10; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 10; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 10.
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that support of counter-nuclear terrorist measures is in its own interests,
individual terrorist groups will have reason and opportunity to escalate
their violent excursions.
The contemporary international legal order has tried to cope with
transnational terrorism since 1937 when the League of Nations produced
two conventions to deal with the problem. 63 These conventions pro-
scribed acts of terror-violence against public officials," criminalized the
impairment of property and the infliction of general injuries by citizens of
one state against those of another,6 and sought to create an International
Criminal Court with jurisdiction over terrorist crimes.6 6 The advent of
the second World War, however, prevented the ratification of either
document.
An International Criminal Court is unlikely to come into being.67
But there are other measures under international law that could and
should be used in the arsenal of international counter-nuclear terrorism
measures:
1) The principle of aut dedere aut punire (extradite or prosecute)
needs to be applied appropriately to terrorists. The customary excepting
of political offenses as reason for extradition must be abolished for genu-
ine acts of terrorism. Although such abolition would appear to impair
the prospects of even those legitimate rights to self-determination and
human rights, persons proclaiming such rights cannot be exempted from
the prevailing norms of humanitarian international law. At the moment,
the ideological motives of the accused are often still given too much
weight by states acting upon extradition requests. While ideological mo-
tive should be considered as a mitigating factor in the imposition of pun-
ishment, it should not be regarded as the basis for automatic immunity.
2) States must creatively interpret the Definition of Aggression ap-
proved by the General Assembly in 1974. As we have seen, this defini-
tion condemns the use of "armed bands, groups, irregulars or
63. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature
Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc. C.546(I).M.383(l).I937.V, reprinted in 7 INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGISLATION 862 (M. Hudson ed. 1941); Convention for the Creation of an Intera&-
tional Criminal Court, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc.
C.547(I).M.384(I).937.V, reprinted in 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 878 (M. Hudson ed.
1941).
64. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note 65, art. 2,
para. 1, reprinted in 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 62 at 865.
65. Id. art. 2, paras. 2-3, reprinted in 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 62 at
865-66.
66. See Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, supra note 63.
67. See Note, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards. An International Human Rights
Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 585, 591-94 (1990).
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State," 68 but supports wars of national liberation against "colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination." 69 Where it is inter-
preted too broadly, such a distinction leaves international law with too
little leverage in counter-nuclear terrorist strategies. But where it is in-
terpreted too narrowly, the distinction places international law in the po-
sition of defending the status quo at all costs.
The problem, of course, is allowing international law to serve the
interests of national and international order without impairing the legiti-
mate objectives of international justice. But who is to determine the
proper balance? Like all things human, force wears the Janus face of
good and evil at the same time. It is an age-old problem, and one not
adequately answered by identifying the institutional responsibility of the
UN Security Council. The deliberate vagueness of the language of the
Definition of Aggression is less of an obstacle than an opportunity if
states can see their way clear to sensible ad hoc judgments.
But how can they make such judgments? What criteria can be ap-
plied to distinguish between lawful claims for human rights or self-deter-
mination, and unlawful acts of terror? Given the context of a
decentralized system of international law, individual states must bear the
ultimate responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and "free-
dom fighters." At a minimum, the principles of "just cause" and "just
means" should inform their judgments.
V. NUCLEAR TERRORISM: IDENTIFYING FORMS
AND EFFECTS
A. Nuclear Explosives
The low technology nuclear explosives that might be manufactured
by terrorists could range anywhere from a few hundred tons to several
kilotons in yield. The destructive potential of such explosives would de-
pend on such variables as type of construction, population density, pre-
vailing wind direction, weather patterns, and the characteristic features
of the target area. Such potential would be manifested in terms of three
primary effects: blast (measured in pounds per square inch of over-pres-
sure); heat (measured in calories/cm2); and radiation (measured in Radi-
ation Effective Man (REM) a combined measure that includes the
Radiation Absorbed Dose (RAD) and the Radiation Biological Effective-
68. Definition ofAggression, supra note 5, art. 3(g), at 143, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 714
(1974).
69. Id. art. 7, at 144, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 714 (1974).
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ness (RBE) or the varying biological effectiveness of different types of
radiation).,0
Relatively crude nuclear explosives with yields equivalent to about
1000 tons of high explosive would be far easier to fabricate than explo-
sives with yields equivalent to about ten kilotons of high explosive.7 1
Nonetheless, explosives with a yield of only one-tenth of a kiloton would
pose potentially significant destructive effects. A nuclear explosive in this
limited range could annihilate the Capitol during the State of the Union
Address or knock down the World Trade Center towers in New York
City. An even smaller yield of ten tons of TNT could kill everyone at-
tending the Super Bowl.
In assessing the destructiveness of nuclear explosions, it is important
to remember that such explosions are typically more damaging than are
chemical explosions of equivalent yields.72 This is the case because nu-
clear explosions produce energy in the form of penetrating radiation
(gamma rays and neutrons), as well as in blast wave and heat. 3 More-
over, a nuclear explosion on the ground-the kind of nuclear explosion
most likely to be used by terrorists-would produce more local fallout
than a comparable explosion in the air.
B. Radiological Weapons
Radiological weapons are not as widely understood as nuclear ex-
plosives, but they are equally ominous in their effects. Placed in the
hands of terrorists, such weapons could pose a lethal hazard for human
beings anywhere in the world. Even a world "already numbed" could
not fail to recoil from such a prospect.
Radiological weapons are devices designed to disperse radioactive
materials that have been produced a substantial time before their in-
tended dispersal. The targets against which terrorists might choose to
use radiological weapons include concentrations of people inside build-
ings, concentrations of people on urban streets or at sports events, urban
areas with a high population density as a whole, and agricultural areas.
The form such weapons might take include plutonium dispersal devices
(only 3.5 ounces of plutonium could prove lethal to the population of a
large office building or factory) or devices designed to disperse other radi-
70. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 22-23
(1974).
71. Hearings, supra note 38, at 266 (statement of Theodore B. Taylor).
72. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 22.
73. Id.
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oactive materials.74 In principle, the dispersal of spent nuclear reactor
fuel and the fission products separated from reactor fuels would create
grave hazards in a populated area, but the handling of such materials
would be very dangerous to terrorists themselves. It is more likely,
therefore, that would-be users of radiological weapons would favor pluto-
nium over radioactive fission products. 75
The threat of nuclear terrorism involving radiological weapons is
potentially more serious than the threat involving nuclear explosives,
since it would be easier for terrorists to achieve nuclear capability with
radiological weapons. Such weapons, therefore, could also be the subject
of a more plausible hoax than nuclear explosives.
C. Nuclear Reactor Sabotage
In the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, even the average layper-
son has become familiar with the meaning of "reactor core meltdown."
Such an event, in which a reactor deprived of its temperature-controlling
coolant melts in its own heat and produces lethal clouds of radioactive
gases, could be the objective of future terrorism. Incidents involving vio-
lence or threats of violence at nuclear facilities at home and abroad are
already a matter of record.7 6
In comparison with a low-yield nuclear explosion, a reactor core
meltdown and breach of containment would release a small amount of
radiation. However, the consequences of such an event would still in-
volve leakage of an immense amount of gaseous radioactive material that
could expose neighboring populations to immediate death, cancer, or ge-
netic defects. To better understand the nature of the threat, we must first
try to understand the fundamentals of nuclear reactors.
Essentially, these reactors may be characterized as giant teakettles
that turn water into steam. The steam is piped to large turbines that turn
generators. When a typical teakettle is operating at full power, the radio-
activity in its fuel core can reach seventeen billion curies-enough, in
principle-to kill everyone on the planet. 7 Within the uranium fuel rods
in the core, the fission reaction can unleash energy to drive the tempera-
74. Id. at 25.
75. Id. at 27.
76. See D. HIRSCH, B. RAMBERG & S. MURPHY, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A GROWING
THREAT, REPORT TO THE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY
COMM. ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SPNP-85-F-1,
1985); PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM, supra note 36.
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1979, at 82.
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ture above 4000 degrees Fahrenheit-a temperature hot enough to melt
through all protective barriers.78
From the standpoint of radiation discharged, the consequences of a
successful conventional attack upon nuclear reactors could equal those of
the worst accidental meltdown. This form of nuclear terrorism could
result in moderate to major releases of radioactivity into the environ-
ment. Additional problems would arise through release of the inven-
tories of spent fuel customarily located at reactor sites. Early fatalities
are possible, although later cancers and genetic effects would dominate.
In densely populated countries, deaths could number in the tens of
thousands.
Whatever form nuclear terrorism might take-nuclear explosives,
radiological weapons, or nuclear reactor sabotage-its effects would be
social and political, as well as biological and physical. In the aftermath
of a nuclear terrorist event, both governments and insurgents would be
confronted with mounting pressures to escalate to higher order uses of
force. With terrorists more inclined to think of nuclear weapons as man-
ifestly "thinkable," both governments and terrorists would find them-
selves giving serious consideration to striking first.
VI. IDENTIFYING THE PREEMPTION OPTION
In view of the enormously destructive consequences of nuclear ter-
rorism, governments may have to resort to strategies of preemption in
certain cases.7 9 Where a terrorist group functions within a target state,
authorities must be concerned with the protection of civil liberties.
Where a terrorist group operates from the territory of one or more sym-
pathetic host states, the authorities in the prospective target state must be
concerned with the normative constraints of international law, specifi-
cally the parameters of anticipatory self-defense.8 0
International law is not a suicide pact. The right of self-defense by
forestalling an armed attack was already established by Hugo Grotius in
Book II of The Law of War and Peace."1 Recognizing the need to ac-
78. Id.
79. For an unusually frank discussion of "terrorism preempticn" from a tactical point of
view, see S. SLOAN, BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AN ACTION STRATEGY FOR
PREEMPTION AND PUNISHMENT (1986).
80. For authoritative commentaries on anticipatory self-defense by Julius Stone, Quincy
Wright, Myres McDougal, Philip Jessup, and Louis Henkin, see J. SWEENEY, C. OuvER &
N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALs 1456-70 (3d ed.
1988).
81. H. GRoTius, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 201-26 (W. Whewell ed. 1853).
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knowledge "present danger" and threatening behavior that is "imminent
in a point of time," Grotius indicates that self-defense is to be permitted
not only after an attack has already been suffered but also in advance,
where "the deed may be anticipated. ' s2 "It [is] lawful to kill him who is
preparing to kll .... ,83
A similar position is taken by de Vattel. He argues that:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has
the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use
force and every other just means of resistance against the aggressor. It
may even anticipate the other's design, being careful, however, not to
act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of
becoming itself the aggressor.",8 4
The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modem ori-
gins in the Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion
of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule (a rebellion that aroused
sympathy and support in the U.S. border states).85 Following this case,
the serious threat of armed attack has generally been taken to justify mili-
tarily defensive action. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the
governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary
of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense which did
not require an actual attack. Here, military response to a threat was
judged permissible so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 86
Today, some scholars argue that the customary right of anticipatory
self-defense articulated by the Caroline case has been overridden by the
specific language of article 51 of the UN Charter. 7 Those scholars
assserting this position argue that article 51 fashions a new and far more
restrictive statement on self-defense, one that relies on the literal qualifi-
cation contained at article 51-"if an armed attack occurs."' 88 But this
interpretation ignores the fact that international law cannot reasonably
compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating, or even lethal, first
strike before acting to protect itself. Moreover, in the nuclear age-when
82. Id. at 202.
83. Id.
84. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 19, at 130.
85. See Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
86. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 985 (2d ed.
1952) (quoting Daniel Webster).
87. See Note, NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EMERGING
STANDARD FOR A NUCLEAR AGE, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 20G.03 (1984).
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waiting to be struck first may be equivalent to accepting annihilation-
the right of anticipatory self-defense is especially apparent.
What about the territorial sovereignty of states that host terrorist
groups? Would not a preemptive attack against terrorists contemplating
use of nuclear weapons violate such sovereignty and represent, therefore,
an act of aggression? Not at all! As we have already noted, states have
the obligation under international law to prevent their territory from be-
ing used as a base for terrorist operations against another state. Where
this obligation is not met, the normal prerogatives of sovereignty are for-
feited and subverted to the preemption choices of certain victim states.
VII. REDEFINING NATIONAL INTERESTS:
PLANETIZATION AND FREEDOM FROM
NUCLEAR TERRORISM
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of international strategies of
counter-nuclear terrorism will depend upon the tractability of proter-
rorist states. Actual effectiveness, therefore, requires commitment by all
states to unity and relatedness. To realize this commitment, all states
will have to work toward the replacement of our fragile system of realpo-
litik with new world politics of globalism.
Preventing nuclear terrorism must thus be seen as one part of an
even larger strategy, one that is geared to the prevention of all forms of
international violence. It would be futile to try to tinker with the pros-
pect of nuclear terrorism without affecting the basic structure of modem
world politics. This structure is integral to all possibilities of an atomic
apocalypse, and its revisioning and reformation is central to all possibili-
ties for survival.
The capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism is inseparable from a new
consciousness by our national leaders. Amidst the precarious crosscur-
rents of global power relations, states must undertake prodigious efforts
to resist the lure of primacy, focusing instead on the emergence of a new
sense of global obligation. These efforts must be undertaken very soon.
What is required, then, is a nuclear regime which extends the princi-
ples of nuclear war avoidance to the problem of nuclear terrorism. The
centerpiece of this universal regime must be the cosmopolitan under-
standing that all states, like all people, form one essential body and one
true community. Such an understanding, that a latent oneness lies bur-
ied beneath the manifold divisions of our world, need not be based on the
mythical attractions of universal brotherhood and mutual concern. In-
stead, the understanding must be based on the idea that individual states,
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however much they may dislike each other, are tied together in the strug-
gle for survival.
The task, then, is to make the separate states conscious of their
emerging planetary identity. With such a revisioning of national goals
and incentives, states can progress to an awareness of new archetypes for
global society. Since all things contain their own contradiction, the
world system based upon militaristic nationalism can be transformed
into an organic world society.
To succeed in this task will be very difficult. But it need not be as
fanciful as some would have us believe. Indeed, before we take the
shroud measurements of the corpse of human society, we must under-
stand that faith in new forms of international interaction is a critical step
towards their implementation.
If all of this sounds grandly unpolitical, it is because politics as usual
cannot prevent nuclear terrorism. And if it all sounds hopelessly idealis-
tic, it must be realized that nothing can be more fanciful than continuing
on the present course. To be sure, today's idealists in foreign affairs-
those who would seek to leave militaristically nationalistic states be-
hind-have little cause for optimism. Their search to actualize new
forms of international interaction is unlikely to succeed. But it is the
only search with even a remote chance of success; the only search worth
conducting. It is, therefore, the only approach worthy of the term
"realism."
Amid all that would madden and torment, nuclear terrorism occu-
pies a place of special horror. Should we fail to prevent it, the world will
never again be the same. Twisting and turning to rid themselves of
human language, the immediate survivors will come to know an alto-
gether unique form of anguish. As for the other inhabitants of a violated
planet, they will demand a broad variety of remedies from peoples and
governments all over the world. But it would be far better to impose
these remedies before there are victims. Let us, therefore, confront nu-
clear terrorism in time.
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